Heidegger, technology and postmodernity by Smith, Gregory Bruce
Heidegger, Technology and Postmodernity 
GREGORY BRUCE SMITH* 
University of Michigan 
This article presents an overview of Martin Hiedegger’s philosophical thinking 
in regard to technology. Heidegger is a key twentieth century thinker whose work 
can be compared and contrasted to the more well known thinkers and their insights 
in regard to modernity. Using Heidegger as a springboard, and locating him in 
the historical context of modernistic thinkers (which include Machiavelli, De- 
scartes, Bacon, Newton, Hobbes) this article provides a definition of modernity 
that coheres to historical and present day conceptions; and treats Heidegger’s 
critique of modernity, technology, and metaphysics as a key to understanding 
conceptions of postmodem political and social life. 
Modernity began as an idea. We can trace its origin, although perhaps only with 
imprecision. It was the idea of Machiavelli, Descartes, Bacon, Newton, Hobbes and 
a host of others. The unprecedented transformations of the modem age are an indication 
that ideas have consequences. Ancient traditions were left behind in favor of a world 
that we projected for ourselves as the product of conscious human choice. Freedom, 
emancipation, liberation and self-determination became the watch-words of the age. 
The thinkers who helped launch modernity shared a revulsion at being the pawns 
of a tradition that was the product of accident rather than choice. They wished to 
cast from their backs the weight of mores which humanity had carried throughout 
history like beasts of burden-camels, to use Nietzsche’s metaphor.’ To use 
Machiavelli’s metaphor, modems wished to “conquer Fortuna.” From the beginning 
the most profound longing of modernity has been to fashion a world that is the product 
of human choice. 
The French Revolution is the quintessential modem act. Ancient traditions, the 
products of centuries of more or less unconscious trial and error-or Burke’s collected 
wisdom of the ages-were cast off. They were replaced by the consciously constructed 
Code Napoleon. The exhilaration of freedom, of choosing, of being the product of 
one’s own hand rather than some mysterious “Other’‘-whether that be God, Nature 
or blind Fate-that is the modem approach to Reality. Karl Marx gave perfect 
manifestation to this dream, to live in a human world wherein we overcome alienation 
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from our true humanity or “species being.“3 The task of the thinker was to change 
the world, not merely apprehend and understand it.4 
Surely the dream is still present and shapes our understanding of ourselves and 
our place in the world. Yet our faith in human reason and its ability to transform the 
world has been severely tested by our experiences in the Twentieth Century. We 
expected Kant’s “universal peace;” we got the most barbarous of wars on the greatest 
scale our species has yet seen. We expected equality; we got the creation of new 
elites that Marx assured us could not emerge. We expected greater humanity; we got 
genocide. We expected the dignity of true individuality as the legacy of post- 
revolutionary freedom; we got the uniformity of mass societies manipulated by fads 
invented on Madison Avenue and the resultant pop-culture and its monotonous life 
on the ever agitated treadmill, to borrow and amend a Tocquevillian metaphor.5 We 
were told that our past was merely the necessary means by which we arrived at our 
truly human present; but as our past traditions faded we came to feel anomie and 
rootlessness and longed to reinvigorate our fading customs.6 As the rational, secular 
world we longed for came to pass, we felt alone and longed for new gods, occasionally 
accepting vulgarized old ones from panderers as better than nothing. At a time when 
we are supposed to be spontaneous, self-creating beings we see impersonal bureau- 
cracies everywhere, and an ever tightening technological web encompassing us, 
complete with impending shortages, ecological imbalances, noxious industrial re- 
sidues , decreased privacy, a shrinking, overpopulated world. 
We are left to wonder if these phenomena are the inevitable product of modernity, 
or merely the ground for impatience and carping on the part of a modernity that has 
yet to arrive at its telos. If the latter, then more intensified doses of modernity are 
in order. If the former, then we are forced in the direction of a more radical kind of 
questioning. With the increasing use of the term “postmodernity” we might suspect 
that that more radical questioning has begun. Yet the variety of competing uses of 
this term throws the discussion into almost immediate ambiguity. 
POSTMODERNISM 
In contemporary architecture the term “postmodemism” is opposed to,“modemism,” 
the movement that gave us buildings dominated by simple geometrical patterns un- 
adorned and with no attempt to camouflage the structural necessities of the edifice. To 
these boxy buildings with long, unbroken straight lines postmodernist architecture 
adds gables, classical columns or other forms borrowed from the past. The result is a 
unique, if sometimes ugly, pastiche of old forms. But no truly novel forms are created.7 
In discussions of postmodernity in the social sciences the term is frequently linked 
with the concept “post-industrial society.” Service industries take precedence over 
industrial means of generating wealth. Information becomes the major form of “cap- 
ital” in the new economy. The “new class” sells this new capital in an increasingly 
global market dominated by computers and satellite information links. A “high tech” 
consumer society comes into existence. Old urban areas are no longer necessary as 
a hub where capital, labor, raw materials, industry and commerce come together in 
the same place. Decentralization and globalization occur simultaneously. 
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In philosophy the term “postmodernity” is linked loosely with “poststructuralism.” 
The post-structuralist focuses on the extent to which Reality is constituted by our 
very acts of trying to use, describe and understand what is. This is true of our own 
being as well. In attempting to explain Reality we in fact constitute it-whether 
completely or partially remains an open question. Post-structuralism builds on the 
notion that Reality is fundamentally malleable, both human and non-human. Since 
we are not beings with a simple, pre-given structure or nature we cannot do our 
constituting of Reality consciously or rationally. That would imply a stable, unchang- 
ing actor. Hence the modem desire to consciously and rationally reconstitute the 
world is seen as a chimera. Likewise, any closure, or “end of history,” is simultane- 
ously rejected. 
As an example, Jacques Derrida’s version of deconstructionism argues that all of 
existence is a text.* In “reading” (i.e., trying to understand) any text we re-write it. 
This is true whether the text is a book, Nature, a society or ourselves. This is a 
constant, endless process that cannot be done consciously, at least not with the 
autonomous self-consciousness prior modernity had posited. Hence we cannot deter- 
mine an author’s intent any more than the original author could. Nor can we ever 
stop rewriting. We do that by living. There is no human experience per se that is 
shared by all human beings; everything is a surface that constantly reconstitutes itself 
in an ongoing play of presence and absence. This is the shared premise of poststruc- 
turalist theorists like Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard or Jacques Lacan. 
Without cataloging every discipline where the term postmodernism has become 
current we can sketch a general postmodernist attitude, style or tone that manifests 
itself artistically, culturally and pop-culturally.9 Throughout postmodemism there is 
a fascination with the surface. This is conjoined with a perception that all of existence 
is a humanly constructed surface that has about it the aura of arbitrariness. This leads 
to an ironic attitude toward life and finally to a form of cynicism. There is a tendency 
to give in to a mocking superiority, the sense that one knows that nothing is worthy 
of passion or commitment because everything seemingly solid dissolves upon our 
approach. As a result, an attitude of indifference, weariness and exhaustion is fre- 
quently exuded. From all of this one suspects the existence of a form of evasion, an 
attitude of avoidance, a blase, unshockable refusal to face up to the terrors that 
surround one in modem life as well as the general groundlessness of that life (a 
groundlessness that is blithely admitted). 
The fascination with the surface. also predictably manifests itself in the characteristic 
postmodernist sortie through past forms that are combined and juxtaposed in novel 
and at times purposely bizarre ways. In place of novelty and creation one gets 
“pastiche, collage, montage. ” “Postmodernists ransack history for shards because 
there is no here here; because historical continuity is shattered by the permanent 
revolution that is [modernity] .“I0 This provides an explanation for the attitude of 
indifference and avoidance. We live in a world of abstractions. Particularity dissolves, 
the concrete world withdraws, we are surrounded by the reign of triviality. Our world 
is an unworld. Such a situation is also explained by Milan Kundera’s phrase “unbear- 
able lightness of being.“” The postmodernist responds by adopting a stance whereby 
he/she will not be unduly moved or hurt by the predicament. 
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One suspects, therefore, an attitude of waiting without weighing. Postmodernism 
ensues when one moves beyond the modem faith in progress, reason and the self- 
conscious will. When the modem faith in man’s ability to self-consciously recreate 
the world comes to be seen as a chimera, and no alternative faith is available, man 
adopts a defensive posture. A time of waiting occurs; we bide our time. By its very 
name postmodernism presents itself as a sequel, something that comes after something 
else. By its very name it designates nothing unique that is explicitly coming. Post- 
modernism does not present itself as on the way to anything. It is a phenomenon of 
a post-historical age, passionless and jaded for fear that making do with the present- 
while keeping at a playfully sophisticated and detached distance-is the safest stance 
that is available. 
THE LOGIC OF THE POSTMODERN 
If we are to be resolutely logical in our use of the concept posmodem it should stand 
for something other than the radicalization or intensification of tendencies that are 
deeply modem. It must stand for more than achieving the telos of modernity; it must 
be beyond that telos. And it must stand for more than rearranging the furniture of 
the past, as with postmodernist architecture, and more generally, postmodernist art 
and pop-culture, where nothing new is created. 
I will argue that postmodernism as we are seeing it manifested in architecture, 
post-structuralism, the social sciences, discussions of pop culture, etc., is a thoroughly 
modem phenomenon. It represents the logical outcome or extension of the modem 
project. I will return to this issue below. 
In the interim, I wish to reflect upon what a resolute use of the term postmodem 
would imply. It will be the contention of this article that pos&nodemity in a resolutely 
postmodem sense is what Martin Heidegger attempted to articulate. I will at present 
bypass the more difficult question of whether he accomplished more than another 
intensification of modernity. It will also be argued that Heidegger’s version of post- 
modernity can be best approached through his very novel discussion of technology. 
Confronting that discussion will bring to light the features of modernity Heidegger 
most wanted to transcend and will provide us with a preliminary working conception 
of modernity. 
According to Heidegger, modems have adopted an entirely unique stance toward 
Reality. For medieval thinkers Reality was conceived as ens creatum, the conscious 
creation of a creator-God who is the highest cause, the ground of all grounds. For 
the Greeks Reality was that which arises and opens itself, the Greek physis (Nature), 
thereby coming into presence, i.e., appearing before man. For example, Heidegger 
argues that for the Greeks “Truth” (aEth&a) is the entire process or event-later 
designated Ereignis by Heidegger-of coming into unconcealment or presence from 
out of “concealment.“i2 Man in turn opens himself to what self-presences and ap- 
prehends it. For premodem thinkers generally, Reality is grounded in something 
which is other than man. For neither medieval nor Greek thought did that which is 
present open itself to us and come into Being because man first looks at it. Man can 
look at or apprehend the world only because something is already present, having 
come forth from concealment or absence in some more or less mysterious fashion 
prior to man approaching it. 
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According to Heidegger, the distinctively modern relation to Reality (Being) is set 
in motion by Descartes. For Descartes, if things are to become present in a reliable 
fashion, they must first be consciously set in place by man. There must be a prior 
projected plan or methodology which determines what will count as Being and what 
will not because it is methodologically unreliable. 
Something must be consciously stipulated in advance as already known before 
modern man can fruitfully approach Reality. In modem science the plan or projection 
that exists first and shapes what will count as having “Being” is a “self-contained 
system of motion of units of mass related spatio-temporally.“13 Such a projected plan 
secures the object sphere only within the terms of mass and velocity. Any other 
manifestation of Reality is ignored or dismissed as false and specious (in Heidegger’s 
terminology, it remains concealed, it is “absent,” it does not present itself). Thus 
Nature, understood as physis, as self preserving, is not allowed to present itself and 
man is denied the possibility of careful observation of that which presents itself, as 
it presents itself (empeiria). It is in this way that all modem phenomena present 
themselves. Man treats the world as a consciously created perspective or “picture.” 
In this way, modem things are set in place or made present-they attain Being-by 
being set over against us as “object” (gegenstund). It is this understanding of Being 
that Heidegger wishes to displace .I4 What counts as Nature or History or any other 
object sphere must be defined in advance by man’s prior projected plan. Once Being 
is brought before man as “objective” man comes to presence for himself as “subjec- 
tive,” i.e. that which lies before as the ground of all being (hupokeimenon). The 
world as objective is a consciously projected “picture” of a subject. The modem age 
is distinctive in that Reality comes to be understand as a picture, as our picture. The 
modem age is the “Age of the World Picture” in which everything is an object 
grounded by a subject.15 
Only in the modem age does the world present itself as a picture. This is Heidegger’s 
understanding of what is distinctive about the modem age. There is no such thing as 
the medieval world picture or world view, except retrospectively. For medieval 
thought the world is not the projection of a human subject, but the creation of God, 
just as for the Greeks Being is self-presenting. Only subjective, modem man thinks 
he opens Reality for himself. 
Only within the modem understanding of Reality is modem science and modem 
research understandable. Modem science is not primarily distinguished by being more 
exact than premodem science; it is distinctive in that it conceives of Being in an 
entirely different way.16 
Experiment begins with the laying down of a law as a basis. To set up an 
experiment means to represent or conceive the conditions under which a specific 
series of motions can be made susceptible of being followed in its necessary 
progression, i.e., of being controlled in advance by calculation. . . Every science 
is, as research, grounded upon the projection of a circumscribed object sphere 
and is therefore necessarily a science of individualized character. Every indi- 
vidualized science must, moreover, in the development of its projected plan by 
means of its methodology, particularize itself into specific fields of investigation.” 
The attitude of modem science to Reality is indicative of the modem approach to 
Reality in general. It is assumed that Reality is not accessible, or not accessible in 
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any coherent way, unless it is set up in advance by a consciously projected plan or 
methodology. Man henceforth consciously decides how everything will present itself. 
Everything is brought to presence as the “standing over against” of an object that is 
re-presented in a subject. Man as subject replaces man as apprehender. As a result 
thought is necessarily transformed into methodology and philosophy is fundamentally 
reduced to epistemology. 
Each object sphere develops its own methodology and epistemology. Science be- 
comes institutionalized by breaking itself up into a variety of specialized fields. The 
world becomes split up into a multiplicity of object spheres. The unity of the whole 
is lost. In fact, it comes to be admitted that the whole is in principle unavailable. 
When modem man looks to find a way to conjoin the various object spheres he 
eventually turns to cybernetics. I8 This gives the illusion of unity. But all relation to 
ontology is lost. In the age of the world picture, we have a situation like that of the 
blind men and the elephant, except that the blind men constitute the elephant in their 
attempts to apprehend it. They each constitute it differently. With no ontological 
foundation, the possibility of a general field theory is an illusion. 
Eventually man not only sets about constituting the various object spheres but 
himself as well. Man decides how everything must henceforth present itself, including 
himself. Man takes his stand to even himself in the mode of measuring and executing 
for the purpose of mastery over what is. I9 Bureaucratic rationality and organizational 
sophistication become the webs in which modem man inevitably is caught. 
As a result, the modem relationship to the world, oneself and others transforms 
itself into a contest between consciously constructed world views-e.g., feminist 
versus deconstructionist, Freudian versus Existentialist, Liberal capitalist versus Mar- 
xist communist versus Fascist, etc. Life becomes a contest over who gives measure 
and sets out the parameters of everything that is. Just as politics becomes ideological, 
personal life becomes devoted to self-definition. And as there is no deeper ground 
than the subject, there is no basis for the amelioration of disputes among competing 
world pictures or self pictures that is not agonistic. World wars become inevitable 
and unavoidable just as does strife between self-constituting groups and individuals.*O 
To support the various pictures or views, 
man brings into play his unlimited power for the calculating, planning and molding 
of all things. Science as research is an absolutely necessary form of this establishing 
of self in the world; it is one of the pathways upon which the modem age rages 
toward fulfillment of its essence, with a velocity unknown to the participants. 
With this struggle of world views the modem age first enters into the part of its 
history that is the most decisive and probably the most capable of enduring.*’ 
In short, modernity finally arrives at its telos. 
The conquest of the world is possible only after it has been transformed into a 
picture. And only after that transformation are subjectivism and individualism possible. 
Eventually, we are forced to decide whether our subjectivity exists in the form of an 
“I” or a “we,” as individuals or communities. According to Heidegger, only as 
“subjects” would it ever dawn on individuals to struggle against the effects of indi- 
vidualism on behalf of the community. Only in fleeing individualism and subjectivism 
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would it dawn on man to make the conscious flight into tradition (i.e. back into past 
traditions that emerged before the world was viewed as a picture and man as a 
subject).22 These are uniquely modem phenomena. 
Furthermore, only as subjects would it make sense to believe that we impart 
“values” to things and then feel the need to debate over whether we do it as individuals 
or groups (i.e., are all values culturally determined or consciously projected by each 
individual). Having projected the Being of the object sphere, the subject must then 
also confer value on its object, an undertaking that Heidegger sees as redundant if 
one is really following the logic of the subject-object dichotomy. The fact-value 
dichotomy could only come into existence on the basis of the modem understanding 
of Being as our projection. According to Heidegger, this would never have dawned 
on the premodem who primarily apprehends that which brings itself to presence. 
Hence according to Heidegger all the novel phenomena of politics and morals, of 
psychological and historical understanding, of modem epistemology, experimental 
science and technology that are taken as indicative of modernity are merely surface 
phenomena that result from our new relationship to all that is. Modems relate to the 
world as subjects that must in advance project Being before anything can come to pres- 
ence as our object. Therefore, we could become truly postmodem only by transcending 
the attitude whereby we see the world as our picture and ourselves as projecting subject. 
Unfortunately, in Heidegger’s understanding modems cannot consciously transcend 
their age. That would imply that man is still acting as a subject merely projecting a 
different picture of the world. Neither can we simply go back to the premodem 
understanding. Both the Greek and medieval understandings differed from the modem, 
but they contained within them the seeds out of which the modem understanding 
grew. Hence, according to Heidegger, it is necessary to transcend the entire Western 
tradition of thinking which he designates as “metaphysical.” Heidegger’s novel under- 
standing is that modem technology, far from being anti-metaphysical, represents the 
final stage of the history of metaphysics. 
HEIDEGCER AND TECHNOLOGY 
Heidegger argues that the traditional ways of conceiving technology are inadequate. 
Neither the anthropological view that technology is one form of human activity among 
many (e.g. including also praxis and theoria), nor the instrumentalist view that 
technology is a neutral tool, a means to an end that can be calculated and controlled 
by conscious human direction, grasps the essence of modem technology.23 For Heideg- 
ger, technology is a distinctive way of revealing or relating to Reality. As such it is 
never simply under conscious human control, for technology’s distinctive mode of 
revealing Reality always stands prior to any conscious act taken on the basis of what 
is already revealed. And technology cannot be just one among many neutral kinds 
of behavior in which man engages. As a mode of revealing of Being, it is the most 
essential behavior of man. For Heidegger, the essence of being human is qua the 
being who is the site for the revealing of Reality. 
For the Greeks, tech& is a form ofpoiksis or making. Tech&, in its original Greek 
signification, brings forth into existence that which does not bring itself forth. For 
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the Greeks this is what differentiated it fromphysis or Nature, which is self-presenting. 
But modem technology constructs a novel relation between techne’ and physis. The 
modem understanding of tech& is not differentiated from premodem techne’ by its 
greater power or precision. It is, according to Heidegger, qualitatively different. 
Modem technology is a revealing that is a “challenging forth” rather than any simple 
apprehending or combining of natural givens in novel ways. It sets upon Nature, 
unlocks it, exposes it, and challenges it to do man’s bidding. Matter is transformed 
from its natural state and kept in the ready in its new state until it is needed by modem 
industry. For example, matter is transformed into energy which is stored and kept 
“standing by” for future use, manipulation and ordering. Modem technology takes 
what is, transforms it and keeps it in “standing reserve” until it is wanted. This is 
what differentiates modem technology for all past poie’sis. 
All of Reality is transformed into standing reserve (Bestand). That into which Real- 
ity is transformed is eventually (as energy) no longer present to man in any way. Reality 
conceived as standing reserve, as malleable, transformable and capable of being stored 
in different states than it is found and will eventually be used, reveals Reality to man 
in a way that is entirely different than as object (Gegenstund), that which stands over 
against a subject. Now a situation occurs where nothing stands in any sense. The 
world ceases to have any “otherness” for man; Reality dissolves into a variety of 
abstractions; nothing is present; there is no here here. Only by initially treating Reality 
as object can modem science so set upon the world that it can transform it into 
standing reserve. The irony is that in the process objectivity dissolves completely. 
Modem objectification transforms itself into the loss of the world. When this 
happens, the subject-which initially projected objectivity-no longer has any place 
to stand. In the account of Being and Time modem man is “everywhere and nowhere.‘lz4 
Without its object, a subject no longer has any Being. The lack of a “there” yields 
what the early Heidegger called inauthenticity, characterized in part by “ambiguity” 
(as to the where of our existence), “idle talk” (love of the superficial play of surfaces), 
and an aimless, superficial “curiosity.“25 In the more poetic account of Heidegger’s 
later work, modem man becomes homeless; he loses all rootedness in his native 
surroundings.26 Heidegger is explaining how modem man comes to find himself in 
a position of groundlessness and rootlessness in the modem age. The world disappears 
in the objectlessness of standing reserve. Needless to say, Heidegger does not see 
going back to objectification as an alternative. That revelation of Reality necessarily 
transforms itself into the more radical technological revelation in which the concrete 
world dissolves. 
First the real presents itself as man’s idea, as something that has no self-sufficiency 
and no capacity to ground itself. This projecting or “enframing” (Gestell) of Nature 
transforms itself into standing reserve. Reality comes to be understood as primarily 
determined by such abstract categories as “capital” and “energy.” Reality, in being 
transformed into something abstract, becomes simultaneously something absent. Ab- 
sence takes precedence over presence in our lives.27 
Whether we are talking about modem physics or price theory, the technological 
approach to Reality sets itself up to see how nature responds when challenged and 
conceptualized theoretically. If the response is “positive,” that specific form of chal- 
lenging is projected as Reality. If not, another attempt is made. But as life becomes 
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more abstract and as the world becomes more absent it is difficult to know how to 
evaluate the competing conceptualizations: what constitutes “positive?” Hence the 
process of challenging becomes self-generating without any external referent, without 
rhyme or reason. We get greater and greater technical and organizational sophistication 
as ends in themselves. 
Eventually man too becomes standing reserve, for in the late modern age man is 
incapable of differentiating himself from the rest of Reality. In the late modem age, 
there is no way to relate to the essence of the human as something distinctive. Man 
too is challenged forth-organized rationally and bureaucratically-and calculated 
as an abstract integer qua productivity, unemployment, demographic shifts, population 
statistics, etc. Man reveals himself as something maximally useful when properly 
ordered, arranged and propitiously “sallied forth.” 
We cannot rebel against this technological revelation of Reality for we ourselves 
are revealed to ourselves and understood by ourselves in the same way. We have no 
alternate place to stand whereby we could take up a critical attitude toward the 
technological revelation of Reality as standing reserve. Consequently, modem technol- 
ogy is no mere instrumentality that man can consciously and rationally control by 
imposing “values” upon it. We stand within its mode of revealing and cannot stand 
outside it. 
According to Heidegger, if modem man is ever to transcend the technological 
revelation of Reality, he must first come into a new relation to technology. That 
means he must cease to understand technology in the traditional fashion. For example, 
man must cease to see himself as its master and controller and cease to see technology 
as a neutral tool. Heidegger feels that his novel understanding of technology helps 
accomplish this new relation. 
From out of that new understanding it is possible that a new relationship to Reality 
can eventually emerge. Until now modem man has seen technology as the benign 
tool by which he fashioned his emancipation, liberation, equality and humanity. When 
we cease to see technology in the proto-modem fashion a new relation to technology 
has begun. When we come to see that we tighten our chains in trying to willfully 
quit the grips of the modem technological view of Reality we have likewise come 
into a new relationship to our world. 
It is out of these initial transformations of our relation to technology that Heidegger 
hopes a new revelation of Reality, that is neither objectifying nor based on standing 
reserve, can emerge. If one properly understands the modem predicament, Heidegger 
believes it becomes clear that that new understanding or revelation will have to come 
from unconscious poitsis, not conscious, rational thought. Hence the later Heidegger 
turns to discussions of the ontological foundations of genuine poetry. For Heidegger, 
poetry is not just the realm of the production of the beautiful, the arena of aesthetics, 
but a distinctive mode of revealing Reality that is potentially higher than that of 
modem technology. Heidegger attempts to reverse the relationship that now exists 
between poetry and the “hard” disciplines. 
When reality is revealed as standing reserve-as something absent and abstract- 
Heidegger argues that man is endangered in his relation to himself and everything 
that is.28 Man is cut off from that mysterious ground of all that comes to presence 
(physis, al&h&a). When the technological mode of revealing is in place every other 
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possibility is driven out: e.g. art, great statesmanship, religion. Likewise that which 
reveals itself (Being qua physis) is cut off from man. We become locked in one 
monolithic mode of relating to Reality which makes impossible the future approach 
of any others. Stagnation occurs within the monotonous, agitated, ever changing 
challenging of this monolithic mode of revealing. With no new revelation possible 
we arrive at the end of History, i.e., the end of novelty. Man’s essence as openness 
to Being in all its possible manifestations is destroyed. Life becomes not only abstract, 
homeless and worldless, but uniform, monotonous and unchangeable. This is what 
Heidegger means when he says we have ceased to be historical beings; we have 
become beings that can no longer create History. All life and all thought at best 
becomes epigonal.29 
This is the danger of modern technology. We had to experience this danger before 
we would be willing to transcend the modern understanding. Furthermore, for Heideg- 
ger, overcoming technology ultimately requires transcending the entire Western trad- 
ition of metaphysics. Heidegger’s novel view is that technology is the final culmination 
of metaphysics. Hence, we must be open to a new mode of revealing of Reality that 
is not metaphysical. 
Technology forces us to lose our relation to “otherness.” We come to see ourselves 
as the only thing in Reality. We lose our relation to that which is not simply our 
projection. This had already been prefigured in the metaphysics of Plato. In Heideg- 
ger’s way of posing the matter, when we realize that “enframing” is the “destining” 
(deferred ramification) of a previous mode of revealing (the platonic, metaphysical), 
the “saving power” draws near and sets in motion the possibility of a new, future 
mode of revealing.30 We open, in short, the possibility of a new, postmodem (which 
also means post-metaphysical) return to immediacy and the recovery of the Other. 
Technology is immune to simple willful control, but it is not immune to another 
form of revealing. Unfortunately, by the logic of the argument, we cannot will that 
new mode of revealing; all we can do is prepare for it. Put another way, Heidegger’s 
philosophy can clear the ground; someone else must do the planting. Art and Poetry 
are what Heidegger designates as the most fecund possibilities. 
ON BEING 
According to Heidegger, technology, as the ultimate outcome of the metaphysical 
mode of thought, emanates from Plato’s transformation of the pre-Socratic notion of 
Being asphysis and ale’theia into Being conceived as eidus and idea. Being, understood 
as self-emergence into presence, is intimately linked with the possibility of appearance. 
Being and appearance were intimately linked in the initial, pre-Socratic conception 
of Being. Man was the apprehending being who stood in the presence of that which 
brings itself to appearance while also remaining in concealment. 
Plato built upon this Western understanding of Being which implicates presence. 
But Plato transformed it by concluding that the realm of appearance was one of 
shadows, error and falsity. He diminished the status of that which was immediately 
present to apprehending man. The realm of appearance was reduced to the status of 
Becoming. Being was transferred to another realm, the realm of the ideas. Being 
was transformed into an idea. But Being was still understood as presence in the 
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Platonic understanding. Being-i. e . the ideas-was immediately present to thought. 
The realm of the senses, like the realm of appearance, was lowered in status. That 
which is available to thought came to be seen as more present than that which was 
available to mere apprehension. 
Initially, the realm of the ideas remained something that man merely “gazed” at. 
The ideas were not seen as constituted by man. But in transforming Being into Idea, 
Plato paved the way for the modem projecting of Being as man’s idea. That in turn 
made possible the transformation of being into the “object” of a “subject.” And that 
in turn was the prerequisite for the coming into being of modem technology whereby 
the realm of objectivity is transformed into “standing reserve,” that which is not an 
object, does not appear, and is in no way present. 
Plato set in motion the long process by which man lost presence altogether and 
was expelled from the here and now. Eventually, in the technological conception of 
Reality, everything that surrounds us simply dissolves. Man came to be a being who 
had no place, stood nowhere, and was dominated by the abstract and the absent. The 
complete withdrawal of presence for Heidegger is the same as the withdrawal of 
“Being,” which while never completely present, has nonetheless an appearing aspect.31 
The complete withdrawal of Being in the modem age is what Heidegger means by 
nihilism. Being no longer in any way inheres in beings. 
Hence, Heidegger’s prescription is that we return to the original Western revelation 
of Being. We return to the point at which Western nihilism commenced. The trans- 
cendence of the nihilism of the modem world requires remembrance of the initial 
Western revelation of Being as a propaedeutic. It does not require simply pasting the 
East alongside the West as some would have us believe-e.g., Zen plus modem 
technology. Remembrance is only a propaedeutic. One must strike off from the 
reappropriated origins, building a new way of revealing Being and man. Heidegger’s 
thinking is not a form of backward looking Romanticism. Heidegger would have us 
return to the point at which the oblivion of Being began. But he intends to move in 
an entirely different direction than that taken by the metaphysical tradition. The 
pre-Socratic, Western understanding of Being as physis contains within it unique, 
non-metaphysical possibilities. At least that is what Heidegger believes. 
According to Heidegger, only now is the overturning of metaphysics possible.32 
The history of the West had to work itself out to the point of greatest danger, “the 
darkening of the World,“33 before a healthy relation to reality could be accomplished. 
For Heidegger, things in the West have never been quite right. The entire history of 
the West is the history of the growing alienation from and oblivion of Being. To 
allow Being to again presence initially involves seeing that there is something Other 
than man that is not his object. That Other is, however, not fixed or static, and it is 
not the opposite of appearance. Explaining this difficult notion partially accounts for 
Heidegger’s complicated language and mode of presentation. 
According to Heidegger, his novel understanding has never been yet approached. 
The Greeks saw Being as Other than man, but fixed and determinate. The modems 
came to see Being as changeable because it was a product of human projections. 
Being was changeable but it was man’s projection rather than self-subsisting. Heideg- 
ger puts the two together in such a way that Being is Other than man, changeable and 
never completely present. Whether this conception is in fact novel remains a question. 
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POETRY AND ART 
In preparing his new conception of reality, Heidegger thinks that he opens the way 
to the potential, future overcoming of the technological relation to reality that has 
hegemony in the modern world. Ultimately, however, the actual overcoming cannot, 
in Heidegger’s understanding, be accomplished by philosophy. It will be accomplished 
by poetry and art. This leads Heidegger to his distinctive discussions of poetry and 
art. He tries to show that poie’sis must be understood as a mode of the revealing of 
reality and not merely the conscious production of the beautiful. Art does not move 
primarily in the realm of the aesthetic. The “aesthetic” realm is understood by modem 
man as the facade man pastes onto his “objects.” Art so understood is too easily 
co-opted by the technological attitude of planning and mastery. It transforms itself 
into the art industry and mass art. Such art does not reveal the world in any uniquely, 
non-technological fashion. As a reaction against the mass art industry, most post- 
modernist art, qua negation, still remains determined by it. 
According to Heidegger, true art and poetry reveal reality in a prescientific fashion. 
In his famous discussion of “the fourfold,” Heidegger argues that in our prescientific 
and pretechnological relation to the world we dwell on the earth, under the sky, 
before the divinities and beside other mortals.34 Earth, Sky, Divine and Mortal together 
are indictive of a prescientific or phenomenological revelation of things. It is likewise 
indicative of Heidegger’s understanding of how man relates to a world in which he 
takes the phenomenological realm of appearance seriously. It is further indicative of 
how Heidegger thinks reality reveals itself when it is not objectified or reduced to 
standing reserve by the prior conscious projection of a human plan. 
Heidegger thinks that art reveals reality in a way that is closer to the original, 
pre-Socratic understanding of Being as ale’thia and physis, where reality brings itself 
to stand. Such a relation is important to Heidegger because he has concluded that 
only within this kind of relation to reality is genuine human dwelling and rootedness 
possible. “Dwelling” for Heidegger means having around one a world that is familiar, 
within which man can act with a good conscience and without adopting the detached 
stance of irony and cynicism. “Dwelling” is the alternative to the rootlessness and 
homelessness Heidegger attributes to technological world. And true dwelling requires 
poetry: “Poetically man dwells.“35 
Unfortunately, Heidegger’s account is complicated by the fact that he sees man as 
intimately implicated in the process of revealing reality, of bringing it forth into 
presence out of a prior, mysterious concealment. This is true even of the poetic 
revelation of reality. Man belongs to the process of unconcealment or coming to 
presence (later formulated by Heidegger as the “event of appropriation” Ereignis). 
Man is the “site” where Being presences. Man is a space, place or “there” (as in 
Da-sein) for thruth (ale’theia) to happen. How active man is in this process is never 
quite clear in Heidegger’s work. When man tries willfully and consciously, in the 
mode of modem technology, to master Being, he fails and closes himself off from 
the mysterious ontological source. 
Since this mysterious source never completely reveals itself as metaphysicians 
hope, it always remains to some degree concealed and absent. Consequently, for 
Heidegger the ontological ground is always an Abgrund. But in our time the ground 
no longer shows itself at all in the things that surround us. This is the basis of modern 
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nihilism understood by Heidegger as the dissolution of everything into an abstract 
and absent “standing reserve.” And Being will not reveal itself in a new way until 
man adopts a new stance to reality. 
In a way, it seems man must be active in the Being process. Indeed in the early 
works Heidegger says that the poets “wrest” Being into presence by their works.36 
Later Heidegger sees great art as the product of grace. Either way it is the great 
works of poetry and art that open up and make space for things to reveal themselves. 
Only after primordial, prescientific space has been opened up for our familiarity and 
involvment is it possible for man to stand back in an act of Cartesian detachment, 
abstract from primordial spatiality, and project uniform three dimensionality and 
quantitative extension. The prescientific revelation of space is always prior to the 
possibility of enframing. The poets open up the prescientific. In some fashion man 
must do something first to open the space where things can be present. 
Increasingly, the later Heidegger makes it clear that the great works of art are not 
conscious constructions but acts of inspiration that overwhelm the artist. And this is 
consistent with any number of accounts of poets and artists that the inspiration for 
their work comes when it wants and not when they will it. The poets are the conduits 
for Being to presence. 
As early as Being and Time Heidegger makes it clear that his understanding of our 
primordial relation to the world is one of immersed involvement. We are “naturally” 
projected outside ourselves, alongside the things in the world with which we are 
actively involved-whether that be tools, loved ones or the well-being of our nation. 
Western metaphysical thinking has alienated us from this immediate relation to reality. 
Genuine art and poetry-seen not as merely aesthetic but as modes of revealing the 
truth-can re-establish this relation in some new post-metaphysical fashion. Heidegger 
tries to elevate the ontological status of poetry and art as more primal than modem 
science and technology. He also tries to show how they differ from the conscious 
projecting of modem technology. Again, the difficulty in doing this helps account 
for Heidegger’s formidable way of writing. 
Poetry and art are the ontologically most primordial modes of revealing because 
in a genuine relation to reality, experience presents itself in “wholes.” This is not 
the case in metaphysical thought according to Heidegger. For example, Aristotle 
presented reality as an underlying substance to which characteristics are attached (qua 
accidents). For Kant reality is the unity of the manifold. For Plato it is matter plus 
form. Heidegger argues that the unit of primordial experience is always something 
whole like a rainstorm rather than an ensemble of sensations and/or thoughts. In 
another example, he observes that when working we are absorbed in our project, one 
with the hammer, the wood and the immediate environs. Only poie’sis can reveal the 
world in this primordial fashion and simultaneously bind man to it. In doing so it 
brings a distinctive historical world to pass and binds us to a particular part of the 
earth. In a primordial relation to reality we are always autochthonous. And for 
Heidegger all human well-being and greatness requires such limit @eras) and rooted- 
ness. No rootless, global, cosmopolitan civilization can allow Being to presence in 
things. 
Heidegger’s account is also complicated by the fact that in his understanding 
primary Nature is never a home for man. In Heidegger’s thought there is absolutely 
no Romanticist longing to go back to a simpler, more natural, earlier form of human 
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existence. Only when art opens a distinct historical World for man is he bound to 
the “earth” (a phenomenological category for Heidegger) in a “sheltered” fashion. 
Primary Nature is not a home for man until it is opened up and revealed as part of 
a human world.37 Plants and animals, and the rest of the merely natural realm, have 
no world. They are linked to their surroundings by covert bonds that cannot change. 
Not so with man. Earth, Sky, Mortal and Divine are only opened for man in an 
historical World. Yet the category World cannot become a product of objectification. 
It cannot be consciously willed and set in place as a Weltunschauung. Like Being 
itself, the World must remain absent and concealed from everyday experience. When 
it becomes present to us it is because it has lost its force, become moribund in 
revealing the world and become a mmere object of detached contemplation by histo- 
rians. And, Heidegger asserts, no world is acceptable which destroys the Earth and 
its sel-revealing rhythms and its self-subsistence and self-concealing ground. 
Each new, genuine work of art brings with it a new revelation of reality, a new 
presenting of “Being.” There is a ground but it is not static, and to come to presence 
it needs man; it works through man’s infinite variety of ways of revealing reality. 
With a new work, everyting hitherto existing becomes in a way an unbeing, unable 
to continue to be revelatory. For example, the Parthenon is not available to us as it 
was to the Greeks, and it does not now open up or reveal the reality that surrounds 
it as it did for the Greeks. If Being is linked with the idea of “that which comes to 
be revealed,” thereby coming to presence or appearance, then genuine works of art 
bring a change of “Being.“38 
In the realm of art, linguistic works have a privileged position. In fact, according 
to Heidegger, only in naming and saying are things first brought to presence.39 Where 
there is no language reality is not really available to man. At the very least, without 
language man would have no truly human existence. There is no truly human or 
interesting prelinguistic relation to mere primary Nature that is available to man. In 
his essence, man is not a natural being. 
Poetry takes primacy among the arts. Further, true poetry is always an act of 
founding for a distinct group in a distinct place. Language is never universal. Hence 
“wherever art happens. . . history either begins or starts over again.“40 The task of 
thinking in our time, according to Heidegger, is to clear the way for such poets, 
legitimize their work as a form of truth, and wait. Philosophy understood as meta- 
physics, science or technology without poetry is always inadequate, always eventually 
leaves man with no here and now, no world; i.e., they lead to nihilism. “Poetically 
Man Dwells on the Earth.” We either dwell poetically-that is prescientifically-or 
we fall out of Being and into nihilism. 
POST-METAPHYSICAL THINKING 
In a future world, freed from the technological revelation of reality, a new kind of 
post-metaphysical thinking will be possible. That new thinking is designated by 
Heidegger with the term Gelussenheit, usually translated as “releasement toward 
things.” Heidegger also designates it as “meditative thinking” as opposed to the 
“calculative thinking” of modern technology. But it is only possible after poets have 
opened a space for the revelation of things in a new way; since the poets are not 
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self-conscious actors, that means only after Being has itself granted a new mode of 
revealing using a poet as its site. 
Again, it must be noted that there is a tension that always is to be found in 
Heidegger’s thought both before and after 1935. 41 The appropriate relation to the 
world is as alttheiu and physis, as Other and self-revealing. But Nature does not 
initially have an open space until the poet provides it. The question is always, how 
prominent is man’s position in the process by which new Worlds come to pass? The 
tension is resolved in the later Heidegger’s thought as much in favor of the Other as 
is possible, given that man is always the site where presence comes to pass. At the 
very least, man must assume an appropriate stance toward Reality before anything 
new can be revealed through him. Nevertheless, thought is always the thought of 
Being itself. The poets are nothing but the conduit for Being; they are not autonomous, 
self-conscious actors. 
For Heidegger, meditative thinking “contemplates the meaning that reigns in every- 
thing that is. “47 We meditate on what is closest and concerns us most. In this stance 
toward Reality we cease to calculate and manipulate reality. We are “released” from 
willful calculation, a “releasement toward things.” Initially this will be a releasement 
toward the things created by technology. But we will be related to them in a new 
way. There will occur an awe and wonder that they are there at all. We will be led 
toward reflection on the essence of our historical existence. We will come to ask the 
new question: “Why and how are such things here at all?’ 
In the process we will be led toward “the mystery.” In Heidegger’s terms, Gelus- 
senheit consists of “releasement toward things” and “openness to the mystery.” This 
openness to the mystery is that which is most distinctively post-metaphysical in 
Heidegger’s thought. Metaphysics thinks only that which is already present. It thinks 
Being as total presence. It also thinks Being as a totally graspable ground. It thinks 
being as causative, totally present ground .43 The new thinking will think its way 
toward reflecting on the very possibility of presence. According to Heidegger, presence 
is dependent on a prior opening. “That” which is absent is responsible, in a mysterious 
way, for the opening that makes presence possible. “It gives” (es gibt) the possibility 
of presence through the poets. The new thinking will think “Difference” rather than 
only presence. In other words, it will think both presence and absence. It will think 
about that absent source which grants the possibility of presence while simultaneously 
holding itself back in “concealment.” “Being,” “the mysterious,” simultaneously 
reveals and conceals itself. Absence can never be calculated and dominated in the 
technological fashion of enframing. 
The new thinking will think its way toward the mysterious Abgrund that can never 
be entirely present, which grants the possibility of presence for the things that man 
can apprehend. The new thinking will try to think the ongoing process by which 
mysterious Being both reveals and conceals itself, and reveals itself in a series of 
historically unique ways. The new thought will, therefore, think the History of Being 
(Seinsgeschichte). It should be clear why Heidegger thinks he must adopt a novel 
terminology to describe this new thinking and its object. Whether non-metaphysical 
speech is possible is another question. 
Since the ultimate, mysterious, Abgrund never reveals itself completely, it can 
never be reduced to metaphysical, representational thinking. Like the God of the Old 
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Testament, we will be forbidden to have any “pictures” or images of it. Just as 
Yahweh describes itself cryptically as “I am that I am,” Heidegger describes the 
mysterious object of future thought as “it,” the it that “gives.“44 What it gives or 
grants is presence. Hence this explains Heidegger’s fascination with the German 
phrases es gibt, which means both “it gives” and “there is.” “Thereness” for Heidegger 
always denotes having a place, which is the prequisite for being present. That is why 
man is defined as Da-sein, a being that is ontologically a “there.” To lose that 
thereness is to threaten man’s essence. 
In the modern world, thinking has been reduced to “theory,” where consciously 
constructed operational models become dominant. For Heidegger, such thinking has 
no ontological foundation. The new thinking will contemplate a self-revealing Other. 
It will contemplate the mysterious relation of presence and absence. It will think 
presence and absence as a self-revealing whole. It will be a thinking about the mystery 
of existence. It will reappropriate a relation to Reality the Greeks designated by the 
term thaumazein. Awe and wonder will replace the illusion of technical competence. 
This is the new thinking that will replace the conscious technological “steering of 
the possible planning of the arrangement of human labor.“45 
Precisely what the concrete political and moral ramifications of approaching Reality 
in this new way would be, Heidegger does not say. To do so would, in his mind, 
be a metaphysical projection of the future. That is the mode of thinking he is trying 
to transcend. 
CONCLUSIONS 
What does Heidegger have to add to our discussion of the possibility of postmodernity, 
understood in the resolute sense advanced above? If we work within the perspective of 
Heidegger’s thought, postmodernism in its many contemporary manifestations is 
anything but postmodern. Postmodernism is a logical outcome of modernity. For 
example, “post-industrial society” represents the very telos of modernity It is Marx’s 
post-historical world, the product of human creation which is no longer dependent on 
the rhythms of nature, where numbing manual labor is reduced to a minimum. “Post- 
industrial” society is the very incarnation of the Rationalist/Enlightenment dream. 
Post-modernism in philosophy is an extension of Nietzsche’s altogether modem 
thought which culminates in the observation that all of life is interpretation grounded 
in the will to will. “Poststructuralism” is primarily Nietzsche shorn of the self- 
conscious will to will. 46 And Nietzsche’s thought is just an intensification of Hobbes’ 
nominalism: i.e., “we know only what we make.” 
It could also be asserted that poststructuralism is just an intense form of modernity’s 
anti-nature animus.47 If there is a fixed and given Nature then the modem desire to 
reshape the world is radically limited. Therefore, modernity set out to demonstrate 
the fluidity and malleability of nature and in the end made it dissolve completely. 
When Machiavelli set out to conquer Fortunu, he built on the notion that Nature 
could be conceived as Accident or Chance rather than Necessity. Hobbes and Locke 
wished to quit the state of nature because as they presented it it was a state inimical 
to the good of man-another version of the anti-nature animus. Likewise, Kant 
opposed the realm of freedom to the realm of nature. The realm of freedom was 
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where our true humanity was to be worked out. Hegel showed how the realm of 
freedom, the human, geistliche realm, necessarily would come to hegemony over the 
natural. Marx’s communist society presupposed the complete victory of man over 
nature, technologically and spiritually. “Post-structuralism” merely intensifies moder- 
nity’s anti-nature animus. 
That nothing new is coming into being, as indicated in postmodernist architecture 
and popular culture, that modem man has lost his here and now, is the result of what 
Heidegger calls Enframing, our belief we can recreate the world as our “picture.” 
To transcend modernity, to arrive at something genuinely post-modem, one would 
have to transcend the attitude that turns the world into our projection. We would 
have to quit the attitude that it is incumbent upon us to continuously create ourselves 
and the world de nova. This transcendence is what Heidegger attempted. Whether 
Heidegger himself transcends modernity is a question that will have to be deferred 
to another time.48 
Heidegger’s position in a possible move to postmodernity is to be found in the fact 
that he has put into words a powerful, novel understanding. That understanding will 
have consequences. Heidegger has made it impossible to simply relate to the modem 
world in the same fashion that we have in the past. Others have trod a similar path, 
but none have articulated their understanding with the same force and comprehensive- 
ness as Heidegger. Henceforth, no serious person will be able simply to ignore the 
Heideggerian critique. 
The modem world comes complete with its own distinctive view of Reality, history, 
politics and morals. Technology, liberation, individualism, progress, subjectivism, 
democracy, etc., represent an ensemble of ideas that are indicative of the modem 
understanding. Those ideas are linked; to begin to question any of the parts is to call 
into question the whole. Heidegger undertakes that questioning in a powerful way. 
What he has said-and hence unleashed-can never again be unsaid. The danger is 
that in transcending the features of late modem life that are the ground for significant 
dissatisfaction, we run the risk of throwing the baby out with the bath water. The 
baby in this case consists of modem democratic political institutions, individual 
freedoms and emancipation from numbing labor and drudgery. Can we transcend 
increasing technological and organizational domination and a growing cynicism, 
rootlessness and worldlessness without losing what is valuable? 
In the modem understanding, modem technology has been depicted as a benign tool 
that makes our liberation from Nature feasible, thereby making our political equality 
a possibility, our self-determining individualism conceivable, mass democracy a re- 
ality. By presenting technology as a danger-and again, Heidegger is not alone in 
this-and subjectivism as metaphysical, one presents a new understanding that reveals 
in a new way. As a result we are forced to take a new relation to it. That new relation 
will have different ramifications than the one that saw technology as a benign instru- 
mentality that is philosophically and political neutral, and masterable by autonomous 
“subjects.” Thinking the essence of modernity as technological, and technology as 
Enframing, is a new way of viewing realty. Changes in thought go forward first. By 
radically questioning, and probably negating, the legitimacy of a previous mode of 
thought a whole train of consequences is set in motion. Precisely what those consequ- 
ences will be can never be entirely predictable. Thought does not have any one-to-one 
causal relationship to concrete changes. Nonetheless, it surely has ramifications. 
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Heidegger rethinks technology, as something different than neutral tool, friend, 
saviour, ground of freedom, and under conscious human control. Heidegger also 
rethinks our relation to History. Unlike the modem understanding, for Heidegger, 
History is not the progressive unfolding of self-conscious freedom but rather the 
unfolding of our alienation from the world, i.e., nihilism. On an equally fundamental 
level Heidegger rethinks the relation between metaphysics and technology. No longer 
is metaphysics seen as the alternative to or enemy of modem science and technology; 
technology is now metaphysics carried to its logical conclusion. Heidegger depicts 
metaphysics not as traditionally understood, as thinking about the transcendent-as 
the metu might lead one to believe-but as an extension of the understanding of 
Being as presence. The point is that after core ideas-frequently adopted uncon- 
sciously-of the modem age have been questioned as radically and fundamentally 
as Heidegger does, it is impossible to relate to modernity in the same naive way 
again. Even in trying to prop up modernity and re-establish it, we will be related to 
modernity in a novel fashion. For example, in the past it was never necessary to 
re-establish modernity. This new relation to modernity, and Reality more generally, 
will have consequences. Again, even in trying to confront and transcend Heidegger, 
Heidegger will have reshaped the debate. Thereby, he has changed the parameters 
of all future discussion. 
It is impossible to know in advance precisely what Heidegger’s influence will be. 
And that is Heidegger’s point. Once one calls technology into question as the only 
legitimate mode of revealing, one hopes Reality will eventually be revealed in some 
mysterious, unpredictable new way. That is what Heidegger means when he talks 
cryptically about a new revelation of Being. Heidegger is being genuine when he 
claims he does not know what that revelation will be. 
It is impossible to know what to call a future age marked by a new relation to 
Reality, one that is no longer modem. Ages are only designated after the fact. The 
“middle ages” could not be middle until a third age had appeared that could, along 
with classical antiquity, act as the second bookend. To explain what postmodernity 
would be like in non-negative, concrete terms would require us to have already invented 
it and be living within it. To consciously invent and project a future is precisely the 
modem relation to Reality. In consciously projecting futures we reproduce modernity. 
Something truly postmodem would have to come into being on its own. But 
Heidegger is correct in thinking that one can adopt a new non-modem stance toward 
modernity. We begin to transcend an age by beginning to see it in a different light 
than it has traditionally depicted itself. That means in the case of modernity that we 
cease to see modernity as the peak of human experience, as the height of all times, 
as the manifestation of everything good and nothing bad, as an end beyond which 
only retrogression is conceivable. Modernity has pictured itself eschatologically as 
representing the telos of human striving. When we stand outside that perception of 
modernity we have already adopted a new stance to Reality. Modernity’s own self- 
conception absolutely implies the eventual end of history. If we open ourselves to 
the possibility of novel futures we are already moving beyond modernity. 
The modem impasse to which Heidegger’s thought points, and which postmodem- 
km corroborates, is one where man becomes worldless and loses his here and now. 
Nothing new comes into being and man sees himself as trapped in some in-between 
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time and adopts a cynical, ironic relation to Reality as a result. Man comes to see 
nothing in Reality but himself, and becomes enervated and exhausted by that realiza- 
tion. Heidegger’s prescription is that we must recover the Other. But we must not 
conceive the Other as “object.” Likewise we must not relate to ourselves as projecting 
“subject.” Heidegger proposes an understanding in which the other is self-presenting 
and man is the site where that presenting occurs. 
Likewise Heidegger’s understanding sees man as linked fundamentally to a mysteri- 
ous ground from which he alienates himself only at his own peril. Further, Reality 
can, therefore, never be exhaustively or discursively presented in its totality (a con- 
clusion many contemporary theoretical physicists on the cutting edge may be beginning 
to admit as well). This is a different orientation to Reality than the modem, technolog- 
ical orientation .49 
Every civilization has its own distinctive view of man, Reality and the relation 
between the two. Our civilization is technological. That technological understanding 
threatens to become global, making any alternatives impossible. Heidegger offers an 
alternative. A civilization grounded in the way Heidegger proposes will understand 
how human existence stretches into the mysterious. 
Heidegger presents a critique of modernity we cannot simply ignore or circumvent. 
He opens a path to a new way of thinking. But perhaps he goes too far. Heidegger’s 
understanding of poetry may remain thoroughly modem: e.g., it remains a form of 
creation, whereas for premodemity poetry was seen as imitation. In overcoming 
subjectivism and Enframing need we lose modem individual freedoms? In viewing 
the modem relation to Reality as unique, must we derive it necessarily from Greek 
Antiquity? In recovering a notion of the World as self-presenting Other must we lose 
democratic political life? In recognizing the possibility for fundamental change must 
we accept that everything, including the mysterious ground itself, changes? It is 
possible to accept Heidegger’s critique of modernity without accepting everything in 
his teaching. 
I would argue that recovery of a ground for our existence in physis, self-presenting 
otherness, implies that something does not change. The existence of an increasingly 
global, technological civilization forces us to realize some things do change. Those 
who think nothing changes-few and far between in our age-and those who think 
everything changes-to be found on every street comer-never have an incentive to 
enter into the truly fundamental and necessary investigations. One thing that does 
not change is the need for a healthy humanity to engage in fundamental thinking- 
rather than giving itself over exclusively to instrumental rationality-about the nature 
of man and the world. Modem technological civilization tends to obliterate that 
fundamental thinking. Fundamental thinking represents a point of departure. Funda- 
mental thinking always has ramifications. 
I conclude with a suggestion: Perhaps modem political life could be regrounded 
upon a non-modem notion of Reality qua physis, self-presenting Other. That would 
represent a novel synthesis that was neither modem nor premodem. It would have a 
right to be called post-modem. To be completely explicit, a synthesis could be 
fashioned that combines Heidegger’s critique of technological modernity, the Greek 
understanding of physis and modem political institutions. That synthesis would meet 
our requirements for an alternative that was resolutely post-modem.50 
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